Trump Administration Delays Critical Gain-of-Function Research Ban
Picture a lab experiment so dangerous it could spark the next global health crisis, yet the Trump administration just missed a key deadline to rein it in. That’s the alarming situation with gain-of-function (GOF) research, where viruses are engineered to be more deadly, and promised federal reforms are nowhere in sight. This isn’t mere paperwork—it’s about protecting lives.
The heart of the matter is a May 2025 executive order demanding new GOF policies by early September, now overdue by over eight weeks as of early November, fueling biosafety experts’ fears over the National Institutes of Health (NIH) continuing to self-regulate risky science, as The Daily Caller reports.
Start at the beginning: in May 2025, the executive order was signed with fanfare, tasking multiple agencies to overhaul GOF research rules. NIH Director Jay Bhattacharya boldly claimed at the signing that the new policies would “make it go away forever” (DCNF). But by August, in a podcast, he dialed back to a vague “calculation” on GOF’s merits, which hardly reassures when pandemics loom.
NIH’s Troubling History of Oversight
History offers little comfort here. In 2016, NIH snatched GOF policy control from the White House, pushing a weak framework with scant oversight, even greenlighting coronavirus work in Wuhan without national security checks beyond a virologist’s note. September 2025 FOIA emails confirm NIH knew of this risky research but skipped proper scrutiny.
The pattern persists—back in July 2016, NIH canceled a GOF meeting over a “light agenda,” and today’s discussions echo that lax approach. NIH remains structured to dominate its own policy implementation. If that’s not a conflict of interest, what is?
Fast forward to the current delay, compounded by bureaucratic resistance and chaos. A government shutdown over budget disputes, hitting a month after the missed September deadline, stalled progress further. Biosafety experts aren’t buying NIH’s claims that all is “on track” when weeks keep slipping by.
Internal Conflicts Hinder Reform Efforts
Inside NIH, questionable staffing raises red flags. Lyric Jorgenson, leading GOF policy now, drafted a Biden-era version Bhattacharya once slammed, while two officials tied to pre-COVID Wuhan research help shape the 2025 rules. Jeffrey Taubenberger, a GOF advocate, was even appointed to a key drafting role—hardly a sign of tough change.
Personnel drama doesn’t stop there. NIH fired two advisors after an August 2025 report exposed one as a GOF supporter and Trump critic, though their status is unclear, while HHS axed a biosecurity office, consolidating power under Jorgenson. It feels less like reform and more like reshuffling deck chairs.
The White House isn’t spared turbulence either, with Gerald Parker, the order’s original drafter, stepping down in summer 2025 for personal reasons. Newcomer Anna Puglisi, a China tech expert at the Office of Science and Technology Policy, has a murky stance on GOF despite past warnings on China’s bioweapon norm breaches. Her balanced view on regulation risks, noted in a 2023 Nature interview, lacks the urgency needed.
Policy Flaws and Oversight Concerns
Critics rightly flag the May 2025 order itself as flawed, with vague terms and too much power left to agency heads like NIH’s. Proposed penalties, such as a five-year grant ban, are just half the maximum HHS debarment period—a soft tap for research that could unleash disaster. Both HHS and the White House dodging questions only deepens distrust.
Even the order’s evolution disappoints, as an earlier, stricter permanent GOF ban was diluted into the weaker May version. It’s a step back that questions the administration’s resolve. Will they truly prioritize safety over agency autonomy?
Experts like Alina Chan and Kevin Esvelt demand NIH oversight shift to an independent body, not self-regulation. As Chan warned, “The new policy must implement some form of independent oversight so that catastrophic research is not self-regulated” (DCNF). Anything less risks repeating past mistakes on a grand scale.
Urgent Action Needed to Protect Public
This isn’t about crushing science—it’s about shielding humanity from lab-made catastrophes, especially post-COVID-19. Biosafety experts’ concerns over missed deadlines and bureaucratic inertia aren’t overblown. The public deserves action, not excuses.
NIH’s habit of self-policing dangerous research must end, especially when two scientists pushed internal reviews for HHS projects as late as August 2025. Internal fixes won’t suffice when the system itself is broken. Independent oversight is the only path forward.
Here we are, well past a critical deadline, with no clear resolution and a policy tangled in conflicts and historical failures. The Trump administration must find the grit to act before another lab mishap writes a tragic sequel to recent history. America’s safety hangs in the balance.
